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MOVING CULTURE: THE FUTURE OF
NATIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY
EXPORT CONTROLS
Robert K. Paterson*
Widespread border controls on the export of cultural property
are for the most part a relatively recent phenomenon.1 Such controls
only apply to physical objects that can be moved across national
boundaries, but can vary considerably from regimes that operate as
embargoes on the export of whole categories of tangible property
(such as those in place in Egypt and Mexico) to more selective sys-
tems that only limit the export of objects perceived to be significant
properties (such as the systems operative in the United Kingdom and
Canada).' The United States is notable for being the only important
art market country that has never had a comprehensive system of cul-
tural property export controls. There are several possible explana-
tions for this. These include opposition from dealers and collectors
and perhaps a perception that there are adequate resources available
inside the United States to acquire objects about to be sold abroad
which might be seen as nationally important.
There was no comprehensive international legal instrument per-
taining to cultural property export controls ("export controls") until
the 1970 UNESO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property ("The UNESCO Convention").3 The UNESCO
Convention has so far attracted one hundred twenty signatories, in-
cluding the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland,
France, Australia, and New Zealand. The participation of these so-
* Professor of Law, University of British Columbia
1. See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275,
313-14 (1982).
2. See Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced Antiquities and
the National Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M.. L. REV., 123, 127 - 130 (2010).
3. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
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called "market states" is considered crucial to the long-term effective-
ness of the UNESCO Convention. The UNESCO Convention does
not furnish a model law for individual states to frame their own export
controls. Instead, it has served as a legal basis for countries to have
their export controls recognized by other countries. However, the
UNESCO Convention does not mandate the form such recognition
must take. Thus, the United States primarily gives effect to the
UNESCO Convention through.entering into separate bilateral agree-
ments with other state parties to the UNESCO Convention.4
Export controls present a number of complex issues in both inter-
national and domestic law. Under international trade law, export con-
trols on goods ("quantitative restrictions") are prohibited by Article
XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("GATT
1994"), which forms part of the 1995 Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.5 However, Article XX(f) of GATT 1994
contains an exception for measures imposed for the protection of na-
tional treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value.6 The
scope of this exception to Article XI has never been the subject of
interpretation by any World Trade Organization or GATT dispute set-
tlement mechanism, so its exact scope is uncertain.7 Nevertheless, the
continued erosion of barriers to trade in goods, may have increased
scrutiny of any national laws that limit trade between countries, espe-
cially if they are perceived to exceed what is permissible under inter-
national trade law. The sort of export controls that operate as virtual
embargoes on the movement of cultural property may arguably ex-
ceed what is legitimate under the Article XX(f) exception.
Depending on the laws of the particular country concerned, ex-
port controls may also face constitutional or other legal challenges
4. See Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97- 446, 96 Stat.
2329 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (2006); See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE INTERNA-
TIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECIiON, http://culturalheritage.state.gov/implemen.html.
5. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
6. The relevant part of Article XX reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any Contracting Party of measures [inter alia].. .(f) imposed for the protection of
national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 262 (incorporated in General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154).
7. See Tania S. Voon, Cultural Products and the World Trade Organization, (Cambridge
Univ. Press, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 342, 2007) at 100-105, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1211605.
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under its domestic property rights law. Concern about such laws vio-
lating the "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution may have contributed to them not being adopted
in this country.' In other countries, however, these sorts of arguments
do not appear to have received widespread support.
Export controls present many important policy issues that need
to be carefully considered when developing new laws, as well as con-
sidering amendments to existing ones. Amongst these issues are the
following:
I. THE SCOPE OF EXPORT CONTROLS
As noted above, controls vary from those protecting certain lim-
ited categories of objects, such as those of particular historical signifi-
cance to the source country or those produced by well-known artists
or craft persons, to controls of much broader scope that apply to the
export of whole categories of objects relating to particular cultures or
peoples. The latter often concern antiquities for which there is strong
international demand from collectors and museums.
In Canada the so-called "Waverley criteria" apply to objects for
which permission is sought to export. These read as follows:
(a) whether [the] object is of outstanding significance by reason of
its close association with Canadian history or national life, its aes-
thetic qualities, or its value in the study of the arts and sciences, and
(b) whether the object is of such a degree of national importance
that its loss to Canada would significantly diminish the national
heritage.9
This test suggests there are fairly narrow circumstances for when
an object will be refused an export permit. Originally developed in
the United Kingdom, the Waverley criteria are often cited as achiev-
ing a reasonable balance between the demands of collectors and
others to be able to trade in cultural property and the national interest
in restricting the removal of certain objects thought to be of special
significance to the source country. °
Which of these two approaches to export controls will apply turns
on a variety of circumstances peculiar to the source country. The
8. See Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings and the Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2079-82 (2004).
9. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-51, sec.li (Can.).
10. See David A. Walden, Canada's Cultural Property Export and Import Act: The Experi-
ence of Protecting Cultural Property, 1995 U.B.C. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 203, 205, 216; Vivian
F. Wang, Whose Responsibility? The Waverley System, Past and Present, 15 INT'L. J. CULTURAL
PRoP. 227 (2008).
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countries with the broadest controls are usually those with a history of
colonialism and proven vulnerability to loss of cultural material
through plundering of sites. Countries with better developed infra-
structures (both legal and physical) may feel less vulnerable to illicit
activity and choose to adopt narrower export control regimes.
II. EXPORT CONTROLS ON MATERIAL NOT ORIGINATING IN THE
EXPORTING STATE
Canadian and United Kingdom export controls apply to cultural
property originating from outside either country as well as within it.
This may have seemed especially appropriate in the case of the United
Kingdom in light of its vast collections of artworks originating from
elsewhere in Europe and around the world. It seems only reasonable,
however, to ask if such controls with similar scope are appropriate
elsewhere? The Waverley report, whose recommendations led to the
Waverley criteria being implemented in the United Kingdom, viewed,
without much discussion, export controls on both British and foreign
objects as appropriate." Canada has adopted a similar approach, ap-
parently justifying the inclusion of "foreign" objects on the basis that
they acquire a sort of "Canadian citizenship" if they have been in Ca-
nada long enough.
The application of export controls to objects of foreign origin
may have seemed appropriate in the case of a former imperial power
with vast storehouses of cultural material from around the world. For
a country like Canada, however, it may arguably be less justifiable to
apply export controls to foreign objects. It is suggested that the only
situation where restrictions on the export of "foreign" cultural mate-
rial are justified is where the imported objects have some special con-
nection with the source state - such as having long formed part of a
historically significant collection or being the work of an expatriate
artist. In the absence of some meaningful "cultural connection" ob-
jects that do not originate in the source state should not be deemed to
have become localized merely through the passage of time. A further
legal complication is that such controls may be subject to greater risk
of not being within the language of GATT 1994, Article XX(f) insofar
11. Committee on the Export of Works of Art, Etc. (1952). The Export of Works of Art etc.
Report of a committee appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, London: HMSO; see also
Neil Broady, The Licensing of Archeological Material from the United Kingdom, HOUSE OF
COMMONS, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselectcmcumeds/371/00413
08.htm.
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as that exception only applies to "national treasures" and in so doing
perhaps suggests it is limited to material of local origin."2
1II. SHOULD EXPORT CONTROLS BE ACCOMPANIED BY JUDICIAL
OR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW MECHANISMS?
A frequent criticism of the administration of national export con-
trols is that no meaningful system is available for applicants to chal-
lenge a refusal of permission to export a particular object. In Canada,
the Cultural Property Export Review Board (the "Review Board") re-
examines refusals of export permits on request. 3 The Review Board
currently consists of nine persons, from the museum, art gallery, artis-
tic, and archival communities. There is no special statutory procedure
in place in Canadian law to challenge decisions of the Review Board
and there are no reported examples of such challenges having oc-
curred. Were one to happen it would be based on the rules set out for
judicial review of administrative decisions in the Federal Courts Act.14
It is unlikely that a Canadian court would disagree with the merits of a
Review Board decision, but would only interfere if it thought that the
Review Board had failed to observe procedural fairness or the princi-
ples of natural justice. To achieve fairness and inspire confidence, any
system of permits to export cultural property needs transparency and
a credible system of administrative review.
IV. ADDRESSING PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
There is a fairly general consensus that enforcement is a major
problem surrounding export controls. This appears to be a result of a
combination of circumstances. First, there is often widespread, public
unawareness of the existence of the controls that are in place which, in
turn, may lead to widespread inadvertent non-compliance. Second,
border inspections are usually more thorough in the case of imports
than exports. Third, border officers may lack the skills and training to
be able to identify objects that require permission to be exported.
Fourth, in many instances the source country may lack the financial
resources and infrastructure to be able to adequately implement the
system of export controls it already has in place. Fifth, in most coun-
tries the art market is largely unregulated and sales of cultural prop-
erty are usually carried out in private. These, and other factors, may
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 6, at 262.
13. Cultural Property Export and Import Act, supra note 9, at sec. 20.
14. Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 (Can.).
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cause export controls to lose credibility. They will need to be ad-
dressed if such controls are to be more effective.
V. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR EXPORT CONTROLS?
Before thinking about where export control regimes might be in
2021, we need to distinguish between two very different types of
source country situations. On the one hand, there are a number of
countries, often whole regions, where unprotected or poorly protected
cultural sites and objects are vulnerable to damage, destruction, illegal
interference, or outright theft. These situations demand some sort of
regulation, usually including export controls, as well as means to
achieve their recognition by other countries. On the other hand, de-
veloped countries with well-developed legal systems, such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, do not typically face such critical situa-
tions and their approach to export controls should be different. The
question that then arises is, "how different"? Approaches to export
controls amongst developed countries are highly variable, particularly
in the absence of any universally agreed-upon model for such legisla-
tion.15 Many British Commonwealth countries have adopted some
version of the "Waverley Criteria" that apply in the United Kingdom.
Overall, amongst developed countries there is a patchwork of national
laws that often bear little resemblance to one another, in wording and
implementation. 6
For many countries, like Canada and Australia, the focus in the
future may shift from policing the export of significant cultural objects
to the acquisition abroad of objects with significant connections to a
country's history and traditions. Canada and Australia make such
purchases with government funds which private funding may increas-
ingly supplement. Following in the tradition of Picasso, there are
often situations where a person born in one country has only achieved
artistic recognition as an expatriate in another. The country of the
individual's birth may often wish to acquire examples of her work pro-
duced while she was living abroad. Such acquisitions can only serve to
enrich local appreciation of the role of individuals in a country's cul-
tural history.
15. See Robert K. Paterson & Tore Modeen, Canadian and Finnish Cultural Property Ex-
port Controls as the Basis for a Model Law, 9 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 21 (2004).
16. New Zealand has recently revised its export control regime and though it implements
the Waverley Criteria, it appears that in practice permissions are not granted to export any Ma-
ori artifacts, regardless of their overall significance. See Piers Davies & Paul Myburgh, The Pro-
tected Objects Act in New Zealand: Too Little, Too Late?, 15 INT'L. J. CULTURAL. PROP. 321
(2008).
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Another force for change is the growing diversity of populations
in many Western countries (such as those of Western Europe, North
America, and Australasia). As populations change, so do perceptions
of what objects are "important" to different countries. This in turn
raises complicated issues about whether some immigrant populations
are large enough to justify the perception that the cultures of their
source countries have become a facet of the country they and their
ancestors have immigrated to.
Another dynamic is the increasing globalization of wealth that
creates "islands" of affluence (often in large cities, such as New York,
London, Paris, and Hong Kong) which have, in turn, become centres
of art consumption. The sophisticated buyers in these places often
compete for the same objects based less on their place of origin than
for their stature in the international art market. How will export con-
trols evolve in this increasingly globalized context?
Export controls are, after all, more about nationalism than
globalization. They are premised on a perceived need to retain mate-
rial symbols of national character and identity.17 Sometimes this is
further complicated when indigenous groups in source countries argue
that their histories of exploitation justify a special focus on the re-
moval of objects of their cultures. 8 Many historical objects from in-
digenous cultures (such as the Maori of New Zealand) left their
source long before export controls were in place.19 This suggests that
acquiring some of these objects from abroad, through purchase or oth-
erwise, will become more of a priority than restricting exports.
While it is difficult to generalize, the countervailing forces of
globalization and nationalism suggest that the future may see the
emergence of some sort of compromise. When courts or governments
in market states are asked to recognize source state export controls,
they are likely to increasingly turn to some sort of "reasonableness"
test to discriminate between foreign laws which appear too broad and
indiscriminate and those that represent a determination to retain vul-
nerable or iconic properties but allow the free movement of material
of less significance or more universal value. Not only will such an
approach present less risk of challenge under international trade law,
17. See Robert K. Paterson, The Legal Dynamics of Cultural Property Export Controls:
Ortiz Revisited, 1995 U.B.C. L. Rev. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 241, 244-46.
18. Id. at 254-57.
19. See Robert K. Paterson, Taonga Maori Renaissance: Protecting the Cultural Heritage of
Aotearoa/New Zealand, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONI-
ZATION, AND COMMERCE 107, 110 (James A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2009).
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but it will better reconcile pressures from market states to acquire ob-
jects for public and private collections with the reasonable expecta-
tions of source countries to retain important examples of their own
cultural material. What is needed now is a vigorous and friendly de-
bate at the multilateral level about the continued viability of export
controls in the case of developed countries that do not face serious
challenges to the integrity of their cultural sites and properties. There
can be few who oppose realistic measures to deal with cultures under
threat of theft or willful damage, but the appropriate export control
measures to apply in less critical situations still await consensus.
